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 Summary & Key points  
Since the founding of the modern state of Switzerland in 1848, Switzerland is a 
confederation of 26 relative autonomous cantons. In contrast to other federations, the 
Swiss cantons are the units that give competences to the federal level and not the 
other way around. 
 
The allocation of competences and responsibilities between the three levels of 
government (national, cantonal and communal) is a complex system, which forms the 
backbone of Swiss style federalism. As a result of a comprehensive reform project 
entitled “national fiscal equalization” (NFE), in effect since 2008, a wide range of 
mechanism for task allocations have been defined more clearly. With the NFE, the 
federation and the cantons are obliged to revise the actual allocation of responsibilities 
every four years. 
 
The guiding principles of the NFE are   
1. Where possible, tasks should be allocated to one single level of government 
only.   
2. Decisions should be taken as close to the citizens as possible (subsidiarity).  
3. Tasks should be always allocated together with the rights to regulate and to 
source tax funding (fiscal equivalence).  
4. Federal laws are often implemented by the cantons giving them the flexibility to 
adapt the implementation to local context (implementation federalism) 
 
Where a task cannot be allocated to one level only, common frameworks come into 
play. There are two mayor types of frameworks, the first involving cantons and the 
federation (joint responsibilities), the second involving only cantons (concordats). The 
landscape of such frameworks is very diverse and no clear overview or system can be 
derived from it. However, the following principles guide the negotiation, the supervision, 
funding and dispute resolution within these frameworks:  
1. The Swiss political system is oriented towards consensus. Political actors 
therefore prefer cooperative to conflictual strategies. In this context the cantonal 
referendum plays an important role, giving a minority of eight cantons the right 
to ask for a public referendum on federal acts.   
2. The Federation tries to guide the implementation on cantonal level through 
incentives rather than through penalties.  
 
To coordinate their policy and to strengthen their voice towards the federal government 
the cantons have installed a number of bodies, like conferences of cantonal ministers. 
Despite their non-constitutional character, these bodies are highly respected by the 
federal government since they facilitate the formation of a consolidated view of the 26 
cantons. Moreover, the conferences of cantonal ministers play an important role not 
only in federal policy but also in voicing the interest of the cantonal governments in the 
context of international negotiations.   
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 Introduction  
  
1.1. THE POWERS OF THE CANTONS IN SWITZERLAND  
 
The federal Constitution, which has been in force in its basic form since the inception 
of the Swiss Confederation in 1848, has placed the federal states (cantons) in a 
particularly strong position from the very beginning. The Swiss cantons are understood 
to have autonomy, or even (although not unlimited) state sovereignty.1 This cantonal 
autonomy and the cantons` equal rights, “as well as their participation in federal 
decision-making and the duty to cooperate with the Federation and with each other, 
continue to be deemed the most important centrepieces of the Swiss political system”.2  
In a period of transition lasting from 1798 to 1848, Switzerland had previously changed 
from a relatively loose confederacy of states to a confederation.3 In 1847, this 50-year 
process had culminated in a brief civil war (Sonderbundskrieg), which resulted in a 
victory by the liberal over the conservative cantons. The alliance of the victorious 
cantons refrained from dictating peace conditions, however, and in drafting the federal 
Constitution of 1848 also considered the needs of the defeated cantons.4  
 
According to article 3 of the federal Constitution, the cantons of Switzerland are 
competent in all areas that are not specifically the competence of the federal 
government.5 A finite list of competences granted to the cantons does therefore not 
exist.6 The main responsibilities of the cantons include, however, the police, the 
judiciary, construction, education, health care, social services and culture. This high 
degree of decentralisation is also reflected in the public administration, where 45 
percent of all civil servants are employed at the cantonal level.6   
 
The competences given to the federal government, however, are listed explicitly in the 
federal Constitution. Unlike in other countries, the sub-national level therefore transfers 
competences to the federal level, rather than vice versa.   
 
In the Swiss political system, with strong federalism, the cantons have traditionally 
always held a high degree of authority, responsibility and political scope. Accordingly, 
the significance of the political centre at the federal level is limited. Since 2008, the 
basic principles of subsidiarity and fiscal equivalence have been enshrined in the 
federal Constitution.7 Together with the “implementation federalism”, they are the three 
                                                          
1 Knoepfel, Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, p. 245  
2 Klöti, Handbook of Swiss Politics, Neue Zürcher Zeitung Publishing, 2007, p.198  
3 See: Thomas Maissen, “The 1848 Conflicts and their Significance in Swiss Historiography,” in: The 
Making of Modern Switzerland, 1848 – 1998, pp.3-34.  
4 Historischer Atlas der Schweiz, Sonderbundkrieg: Folgen, http://www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/textes/d/D17241.php Accessed 21.08.2018   
5 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, Art. 3: “The Cantons are sovereign except to the 
extent that their sovereignty is limited by the Federal Constitution. They exercise all rights that are not 
vested in the Confederation.” 6 Ibid.  
6 Knoepfel, 2014, p. 253  
7 Ch Stiftung für eidgenössische Zusammenarbeit, Monitoringbericht Föderalismus 2014 –2016, Bern 
2017, p. 51   
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key principles characterizing the allocation of tasks between the Federation and the 
cantons:   
 
1. The Principle of Subsidiarity: The Swiss Confederation allocates the 
responsibilities of the state to various state levels. The decisive factor is the 
principle of subsidiarity.8 It follows the approach of a bottom-up allocation of 
tasks. In other words, the communes must assume all responsibilities that do 
not exceed their capacity. The cantons, in turn, assume those responsibilities 
that cannot be handled by the communes. In addition, they must handle all 
responsibilities not allocated expressly to the federation. This makes the Swiss 
cantons important players with political power and responsibility. The federation, 
finally, only handles those responsibilities expressly allocated to it by the Federal 
Constitution. A new federal responsibility must be approved by public vote in a 
constitutional referendum.9 For the proposal to be accepted, a majority of the 
people needs to support it within both, the whole federation and the majority of 
the cantons (a double majority). 
  
2. Fiscal Equivalence (Tax system): As an important prerequisite of an effective 
federal system, the cantons must have sufficient funds from tax revenue with 
which to discharge their responsibilities. In Switzerland, each level of 
government has its own sources of tax revenue as well as the competence to 
dispose of tax funds. Swiss citizens not only pay consumption tax, but also 
federal, cantonal and communal taxes. Amounts vary depending on the financial 
resources and social policy of the cantons and communes, creating a 
competitive situation in terms of tax rates, which can be considered an added 
benefit. Whenever tasks are allocated, the principle to give the relevant level the 
respective authority and responsibilities applies.  
 
3. Implementation of federal policies by the cantons (implementation federalism): 
Although not explicitly mentioned in the constitution it was the general 
understanding that federal law has to be implemented by the cantons. For the 
federation, this has the advantage of reducing its workload; for the cantons, the 
advantage lies in liberty to set their own programme priorities. Since 1999 this 
principle is also assured in the constitution. The liberty of cantons to implement 
federal law is limited in two ways: First, they have to cover at least part of the 
costs and secondly they can only move within the boundaries given through the 
federal law. It is understood that this principle contradicts in some areas the 
principle of fiscal equivalence.10   
  
1.2. IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL/EU LAW ON SWITZERLAND  
Although Switzerland is not a member of the EU, its geographic location and its 
economic interdependence makes the EU and its laws highly important for the Swiss 
legislation. Switzerland is linked to the EU through over 100 different bilateral 
agreements. Different studies have found that EU laws either directly or indirectly 
                                                          
8 While the principle of subsidiarity has always been practiced in modern Switzerland, the term itself was 
only included in the Federal Constitution in 2008.  
9 Wolf Linder, Schweizerische Demokratie, 4th edition, updated, 2017, p. 172. „In the context of the principle of subsidiarity, the literature also 
discusses the principle of non-centralisation.”  
10 Schweizer Bundesrat, Einhaltung der Grundsätze der Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen 
(NFA), Bericht des Bundesrates vom 12. September 2014 in Erfüllung des Postulats 12.3412 (Stadler Markus) vom 29. Mai 2012  
https://www.parlament.ch/centers/eparl/curia/2012/20123412/Bericht%20BR%20D.pdf  
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influence about 50% of Swiss federal law.1112 In fact, researchers in Geneva found that 
in the period 1996-2005 the level of EU law in Swiss legislation was about the same as 
in the Austrian legislation.13 This influence does also transcendent to the policy areas, 
which are reserved to cantonal autonomy. Therefore, it becomes crucial for the cantons 
to be involved in the preparation and negotiation of international treaties by the federal 
government.  
  
 
 Types of Common Framework  
Switzerland has a number of mechanisms that can be described as “common 
frameworks.” These can be divided into two basic groups. The first group consists of 
joint responsibilities (Verbundaufgaben): responsibilities jointly discharged by the 
federation and the cantons. In order to understand the wider context of these tasks, this 
paper first focuses on the general allocation of competences and their mechanisms 
involving the federation and the cantons. The second group comprises agreements 
between cantons without federal involvement.  
  
2.1. COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE CANTONS AND THE FEDERATION  
2.1.1. Development  
In Switzerland, the relationship between the federal level and the cantons has changed 
considerably since 1848. While initially the federation was allocated very few 
competences, rapid economic development and political tendencies in the period 
preceding World War II promoted centralisation, resulting in more power for the federal 
level. Again, in the second half of the 20th century, the federation was given additional 
responsibilities. This included areas of economic policy as well as social policy, 
infrastructure policy, and energy and environmental policy. After 1945, competences 
were divided between the federation and the cantons in most of these new policy areas 
rather than allocating them to a single state level. A system of cooperative federalism 
developed as a result.14   
 
In the course of several decades, complex interdependencies were formed between 
some federal responsibilities, and there was an overlapping of competences and 
financial flows, combined with duplication and a lack of clear responsibility and 
transparency concerning financial transfers.15   
 
2.1.2. National Fiscal Equalisation   
In the 1990s, this complex situation led to a comprehensive reform project entitled 
“national fiscal equalization” (NFE), which has been in effect since 2008. The aims of 
the NFE are diverse. Mainly, however, they include disentangling the allocation of tasks 
between the federation and the cantons and creating fiscal equality between the 
financially stronger and the financially weaker cantons. The NFE is reviewed every four 
years.   
                                                          
11 Sabine Jenni, The Last Gallic Village? An Empirical Analysis of Switzerland’s Differentiated 
European Integration 1990 – 2010, DISS. ETH No.  
12 , Zurich 2014 https://www.research-
collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/154723  
13 Ali Arbia, The road not taken, europeanisation of laws in Austria and Switzerland 1996-2005, 
Geneva : Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2008  
14 Wolf Linder, Schweizerische Demokratie, 4th, edition, updated, 2017, p. 174.   
15 Adrian Vatter, Das politische System der Schweiz, Zurich 2016, p. 433.  
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Article 2 of the Federal Act on Fiscal Equalisation and Cost Compensation lists the aims 
of the NFE project as follows:  
1. strengthening the financial autonomy of the cantons;  
2. reducing the differences in financial capacity and in fiscal burden between the 
cantons;  
3. maintaining the fiscal competitiveness of the cantons, both nationally and 
internationally;   
4. ensuring that cantons have a minimum of financial resources available;  
5. equalising the excessive financial burden of some cantons due to geographic-
topographic or socio-demographic conditions; and  
6. ensuring appropriate inter-cantonal cost compensation.  
  
In dividing these responsibilities, the NFE has created four categories. Whenever 
possible and appropriate, only one level handles one responsibility: either the 
federation or the cantons. This measure ensures a disentanglement of both the 
responsibilities and the finances used to fund them. Beside these two allocation 
options, there is the possibility of collaborating in joint responsibilities, meaning 
responsibilities that are shared. The fourth possibility involves increased cooperation 
among the cantons, which is regulated by means of inter-cantonal treaties 
(concordats). The NFE has therefore also strengthened inter-cantonal cooperation.16   
  
FIGURE 1: THE FOUR CATEGORIES OF RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE NFE  
Competence:  
Only the 
Federation  
Only the  
cantons  
Joint 
responsibilities 
(federation and 
cantons)  
Inter-cantonal 
collaboration   
(concordats)  
 
National Defence  Police  Execution of 
penalties and 
penal measures  
Prisons  
National roads 
and  
Highways (since 
2008)  
General 
damage 
protection  
Completion of 
the network of 
national roads.  
  
Federal Institutes 
of Technology: 
ETH Zurich, 
EPFL Lausanne  
Universities  Higher 
Vocational 
Training  
Universities of 
Applied Sciences 
of Special needs 
education (HfH)  
  
In other words, the NFE can be said to strive for holistic solutions. All policy and 
competence areas are discussed and evaluated. Whenever a competence is moved 
from the federation to the cantons or vice versa, this applies to all cantons equally. 
There is, therefore, no scope for frameworks involving the federation and individual 
cantons.  
 
                                                          
16 See: Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung zwischen Bund und Kantonen – 
NFA, issued by the Federal Department of Finance and the Conference of Cantonal Governments, 
Bern 2007.  
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In their negotiations concerning the allocation of tasks, the various players follow 
different interests: The federation, on the one hand, wants to make rules and set 
standards that affect the whole country. In the ten years since the NFE was launched, 
centralisation tendencies have again increased.17 The cantons, on the other hand, want 
to retain or even expand their competences and their scope for action. Specifically, a 
main issue is the distribution of power between the various state levels in the Swiss 
Confederation. However, the possibilities for the pursuit of specific interests are limited 
because any change ultimately requires the consent of all parties.  
The table below shows a percentage overview of the allocation of financial 
responsibilities between the federation, the cantons and the communes in 2009.18  
 
FIGURE 2: ALLOCATION OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN SWITZERLAND 
(IN PERCENT), ACCORDING TO KNOEPFEL, 2014  
Area  Federation  Cantons  Communes  Total  
International relations  100      100  
Defence  93  3  4  100  
National economy  60  20  20  100  
Traffic, communication  54  21  25  100  
Social security  51  29  20  100  
Police and judiciary  10  71  19  100  
Public health  4  83  13  100  
Education  16  54  30  100  
Envir. protection and regional 
planning  
15  16  69  100  
Culture, sports, leisure, 
churches  
8  32  60  100  
Public administration  23  35  42  100  
  
Improving the allocation of tasks between the federation and the cantons is difficult for 
two reasons: First, recalculating contributions to compensate financially weak cantons 
for their lack of required resources regularly leads to political tension between the 
cantons.18 Second, reorganising the allocation of tasks has a direct financial impact on 
various players at different state levels, which can be positive as well as negative. At 
the heart of the debate is the question as to who decides in what situation and who is 
to be responsible for funding.  
 
                                                          
17 See: “Der Pulverdampf verhüllt die echten Gefahren”, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 October 2014 and 
“Die schleichende Zentralisierung muss aufhören”, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 Auguste 2018. 18 
Knoepfel, Handbuch der Schweizer Politik.  
18 For the purpose of this short introduction, this issue is not followed up any further.  
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Of particular interest in this context are the responsibilities which are discharged jointly 
by the federation and the cantons (joint responsibilities), on the one hand, and those 
that handled jointly by the cantons, on the other.  
  
2.2. JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FEDERATION AND THE CANTONS  
In Switzerland, responsibilities for which the federation and the cantons share the 
financial burden are called Verbundaufgaben (joint responsibilities). Collaboration 
between the federation and the cantons in handling joint responsibilities is regulated by 
the partners involved. Since 2008, funding has been according to a new principle. 
Instead of individual subsidies of projects as in the period before the NFE, in general 
lump-sum or global contributions are now granted.  
 
The group of joint responsibilities is relatively heterogeneous and does not form a 
special group defined by the constitution. Joint responsibilities include   
 
• federal responsibilities (Bundesaufgaben) which have been assigned to the 
cantons (such as cadastral surveying)   
• as well as areas of responsibility where the federation only has limited 
competence or  
• where it does not exercise its competence to the full extent (such as 
agglomeration traffic or the execution of penalties and penal measures).  
In 2015, The Federal Council acted on a motion 19  to submit to Parliament a 
comprehensive analysis of all joint responsibilities, with a view to identify additional 
areas where disentanglement might be possible. The cantonal governments issued 
several statements calling for the active pursuit of further improvement in the allocation 
of tasks and for further disentanglement of jointly funded responsibilities. Currently, the 
Federal Council is preparing the answer to this motion. A list of all joint responsibilities 
analysed in this process is attached in the Appendix.  
  
2.3. CONCORDATS  
In Switzerland, cantons can enter into agreements with each other without having to 
involve the federation. These legally binding inter-cantonal agreements are also 
referred to as “concordats.”  
 
Concordats have two basic functions: Coordination between cantons in their policy 
areas and the pooling of resources among cantons. Concordats serve also the purpose 
to exchange information and lessons learned between cantons. The fact of having 
concordats facilitates joint representation of interests vis-à-vis the federation.20  
 
Switzerland currently has about 800 concordats, whereby the overwhelming majority is 
less than 40 years old. Three-fourths of these concordats relate to bilateral issues 
between the cantons and serve to promote regional integration. They therefore usually 
only concern two or a few of the 26 Swiss cantons.  
 
                                                          
19 Federal Assembly — Swiss Parliament, Motion 13.3363 on the division of responsibilities between 
the state and the cantons, submitted in the National Council on 12 April 2013   
20 Knoepfel, Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, pp.135-138  
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While topics mainly include issues of finance and taxation, concordats have also been 
signed on educational, scientific and cultural issues. Especially in the field of education, 
concordats have become an important instrument to coordinate policy among the 
cantons and setting standards, which in turn limit the liberty of the individual canton. 
 
Since the introduction of the NFE, it has become possible, at the request of 18 out of 
26 of cantonal governments, for inter-cantonal agreements to be declared generally 
binding for all the cantons.  
 
Limitations to concordats exist whenever federal law or federal interests are involved, 
or whenever the rights of other cantons are involved.  
  
2.4. POLITICAL BODIES  
2.4.1. Council of States  
The Swiss federal Parliament consists of two chambers with equal powers: the people’s 
representatives sit in the National Council (Nationalrat), the large chamber, and the 
representatives of the cantons sit in the Council of States (Ständerat), the small 
chamber. The Council of States was established to represent the cantons. It consists 
of two directly elected representatives from each canton.21 As opposed to Germany, for 
example, these are not representatives from the cantonal governments but rather 
elected representatives who are independent of the cantonal institutions, which is why 
cantonal governments have less influence on Council of States policies. Cantons often 
complain that a politicisation of the Council of States has lowered their influence on the 
federal level. Key topics for the cantons are still a priority for this chamber, nonetheless 
the increasing dominance of party politics cannot be denied.22  
 
2.4.2. Conference of the Cantonal Governments   
 
For the above-stated reason, the 26 Swiss cantons agreed in 1993 to establish a 
coordinating body of their own, the Conference of the Cantonal Governments of 
Switzerland (CCG) (Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen (KdK)), aimed to articulate and 
coordinate joint interests in order to have more weight vis-à-vis the federation. This 
move was triggered by the cantons’ dissatisfaction with their low involvement in 
Switzerland's negotiations concerning the European Economic Area (EEA). When the 
50.3% of Swiss voted against joining the EEA in December 1992, the cantons felt the 
need to take a more active role in the federation’s (European) policy-making.   
 
The CCG, as well as the conferences of cantonal ministers (see below), are not a 
constitutional organisation of the federation. Nonetheless they are widely accepted and 
appreciated by the federation since they also facilitate coordination among the cantons 
and for the federation (one strong and consolidated opinion of the cantons).    
 
                                                          
21 The former half-cantons only have one representative.  
22 Federal Chancellery, The Swiss Confederation – A Brief Guide, 2018, p.26: The National Council 
and the Council of States also handle certain items of business in joint session as the Federal 
Assembly (Bundesversammlung), for instance when electing the members of the Federal Council and 
federal court judges. As such, the Federal Assembly is the highest authority in the Swiss 
Confederation, subject to the rights of the people and the cantons. This is an aspect peculiar to 
Switzerland: In contrast to other countries, Parliament elects the government and the federal judiciary. 
Parliamentary decisions are not subject to review by any court.  
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In the meantime, the CCG, which in 2008 established its headquarters, the House of 
Cantons, in Switzerland’s capital, Bern, has become an important institution in the 
Swiss political landscape. The House of Cantons harbours the offices of various inter-
cantonal governmental and conferences of cantonal ministers as well related 
institutions.  
 
For its decisions, the CCG requires a quorum of 18 cantonal governments. The 
federation recognises that this body reflects the interests of the cantons by representing 
the consolidated position of the 26 cantons. At the same time, the cantons have created 
an institution that carries some weight, especially considering that, based on a decision 
by their cantonal parliaments, eight cantons can call a referendum on a federal law.  
 
2.4.3. Conferences of Cantonal Ministers  
Switzerland also has 16 conferences of cantonal ministers (Direktorenkonferenzen). 
Each is devoted to a specific policy area, enabling the ministers from all the cantons to 
meet in order to exchange information and coordinate their interests. The most 
significant conference of cantonal ministers by far is the Swiss Conference of Cantonal 
Directors of Education (Erziehungsdirektorenkonferenz). It is the only such conference 
that is based on a concordat. It has the highest budget (in terms of personnel and 
financial resources) and is authorised to issue its own regulations. Frequently, it is the 
President of the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Directors of Education who represents  
Switzerland as the “Minister of Education” in an international context.23  
  
2.5. NEGOTIATING NEW FRAMEWORKS  
2.5.1. Between the Federation and the Cantons  
The principles of the NFE and the allocation of tasks were incorporated into the federal 
Constitution by referendum in 2004. This referendum had been preceded by a ten-year 
debate involving the federal Council, the two chambers of Parliament, the cantons and 
the Conference of the Cantonal Governments. The referendum was preceded by an 
active public debate in which all parties, associations, NGOs, the media and the public 
participated.  
 
The constitutional provisions were approved in the referendum of 28 November 2004 
by a majority of the population (64.4%) and by a majority of the cantons. This gives the 
principles that were adopted a high degree of democratic legitimacy.  
 
Every four years, the two chambers of Parliament negotiate the compensation 
payments for the upcoming period based on a report by the federal Council. This bill is 
usually highly controversial because of the different interests of the financially strong 
cantons (donors) as opposed to the financially weak cantons (recipients). The main 
debates take place in the small chamber of Parliament (Council of States), in which the 
cantons are represented. On the other hand, this issue is also discussed outside 
Parliament, in the Conference of the Cantonal Governments, and a feasible 
compromise is usually initiated there.  
 
2.5.2. Among the Cantons  
In general concordats come into play if a common solution among different cantons 
makes more sense than am individual cantonal one (e.g. treatment of hooligans). Also 
in concordats many stakeholders are involved, therefore it may take years to find a 
                                                          
23 Knoepfel, Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, pp.135-138  
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solution that suits all cantons involved. In addition, the cantonal government which 
negotiates the concordat has to bear in mind that the signed treaty has to pass the 
cantonal Parliament. Which is not a given thing although the government involves all 
mayor political parties in the canton.   
  
2.6. ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS  
Benefits of the NFE are, that there is more clarity about the allocation of tasks and 
responsibilities between the federation and the cantons, and it leads to more efficiency 
and a balancing out of the burden among the cantons. At the same time, the cantons 
maintain their autonomy to a large extent.  
 
Limitations are that it is not possible (nor is it practical) to disentangle all responsibilities. 
There will always be some responsibilities that need to be discharged jointly.  
 
A restriction, but possibly also a typical characteristic of the Swiss political system, it 
that where responsibilities are allocated to the cantons, different approaches will 
inevitably result. In the best case this leads to solutions the fit best the regional or local 
needs, in the worst case this could violate the principle of equality before the law 
(Rechtsgleichheit).  
 
One of the biggest challenges is the negotiation of compensation payments by 
Parliament. These negotiations take place every four years and usually end in a 
compromise. The political system of Switzerland is designed in such a manner as to 
require a compromise for a political business transaction to take place.24 Such a result 
does not favour any party.   
 
Within the NFE project as a whole, further improvement is targeted in individual policy 
areas and on a case-by-case basis. It is an evolutionary process.  
  
 Governance of Common Frameworks  
  
3.1. MONITORING, EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS  
3.1.1. National Fiscal Equalisation  
 
Every four years, the Federal Council issues an effectivity report (Wirksamkeitsbericht). 
The report of 2016-2019 on the effectiveness of fiscal equalisation between the 
Confederation and the cantons comprises 176 pages. According to the Confederation, 
it provides information on the achievement of the objectives of national fiscal 
equalisation in the past four-year period and proposes measures for the subsequent 
period. Specifically, this means that, as defined in Art. 46 of the Ordinance on Fiscal 
Equalisation and Cost Compensation, the report provides information about: 
 
1. the execution of fiscal equalisation (including data for resource and cost 
compensation);   
2. the annual volatility of the contributions of the financially strong cantons to the 
horizontal equalisation of resources and the compensation paid to financially weak 
cantons within the reporting period.  
 
                                                          
24 See also Chapter 3.4 (Disputes).  
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Parliament uses the effectivity report as a basis for its debates. In the run-up to the 
parliamentary debates, the Conference of the Cantonal Governments also expresses 
its opinion on the results of the effectivity report. In the most recent effectivity report 
(2018), the Federal Council proposed that this report should be published only every 
six years; it argued that four years was too short a period for analysis.25  
 
These effectivity reports are freely available to the public and are published on the 
government website with many additional findings.26  
 
3.1.2. Concordats  
The landscape of different forms of concordats is very vide and so is the process of 
their monitoring. Concordats have to be understood as being more than just treaties 
between cantons. They can, similar to international treaties also create organisations 
that will make the implementation possible. For every concordat those processes and 
organisations can be renegotiated anew and take different forms.   
  
3.2. PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT  
A general distinction must be made between parliamentary oversight at the national 
and the cantonal level.   
 
3.2.1. Institutional Principles  
The principles of the NFE and the distribution of tasks are laid down in constitutional 
provisions and must therefore pass through the national parliamentary chambers. They 
have also been democratically legitimised by a referendum (see above).  
 
The details of the allocation of tasks are regulated in the corresponding (specialist) 
laws. The compensation payments connected with the NFE are determined every four 
years in a federal act. An optional referendum may be held to challenge a federal act 
passed by Parliament. In addition to the normal requirement of 50,000 individual 
signatures a public referendum can also be triggered by the cantonal referendum: Eight 
cantons together can call a referendum against such an act.  
 
Joint responsibilities (Verbundsaufgaben) are discussed over the course of several 
years until a collaboration treaty is signed between the federation and the cantons. This 
is an elaborate process. The treaty must be approved by the federation and by the 
cantons, and the Federal Constitution as well as cantonal constitutions and laws may 
have to be amended.  
 
As already mentioned, collaboration between cantons is regulated by means of 
concordats. These concordats must be ratified by the cantonal parliaments.  
 
3.2.2. Problems with Parliamentary Involvement at the Cantonal Level  
The fact that the cantonal parliaments were able to exert far less influence in the 
preparation and drafting of treaties on joint responsibilities and on concordats than is 
usual where cantonal legislation is concerned proved to be increasingly problematic. It 
is mainly the cantonal government and its administrations that draft and negotiate these 
treaties, which – similarly to international treaties – happens behind closed doors. 
                                                          
25 Federal Council, Wirksamkeitsbericht 2016–2019 des Finanzausgleichs zwischen Bund und 
Kantonen, March 2018, p. 15.  
26 Federal Finance Administration: 
https://www.efv.admin.ch/efv/de/home/themen/finanzausgleich/wirksamkeitsberichte.html   
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Parliaments were confronted with a finalized treaty, which they could, basically, only 
either accept or reject. As a result, the cantonal parliaments introduced the requirement 
that the executive has to keep them informed and requested institutionalised forms of 
participation in the drafting of such treaties. This also includes the establishment of 
permanent parliamentary support groups.27  
  
3.3.  FLEXIBILITY  
Der NFE and related institutional agreements are legally binding. They are either 
decided by the cantonal parliaments in question or even confirmed by referendum.  
A revision of the principles and a change in the allocation of tasks determined (including 
joint responsibilities) is time-consuming and requires democratic legitimation. Those 
elements which need to be adjusted regularly are decided by the Swiss Parliament.  
Concordats are a more flexible form of common frameworks. They can be formed 
between two or more cantons and, subsequently, dissolved or amended. They are, 
however, subject to parliamentary ratification by the cantons involved.  
  
3.4.  DISPUTES  
The Swiss political system is very much geared towards compromise. In a first phase 
the political actors are force by the system to unfold their interest. This allows in a 
second phase to search for a compromise, which is supported by the majority of the 
actors. The system contains also mechanism to exert a certain pressure on the actors 
to find a viable solution as otherwise a political situation arises that is not in the interest 
of most of the actors. This also applies to the various types of common framework. In 
the relationship between the federation and the cantons, it is the instrument of the 
cantonal referendum, in particular, that motivates the stakeholders to find a 
compromise that is as broad as possible. By acting together, eight of the 26 cantons 
can force a national public referendum concerning an agreement involving the 
federation and its cantons if they are unhappy about the result of the negotiations. The 
parties involved generally try to avoid a national public referendum because it is 
associated with many uncertainties. The prospect of one is often sufficient to get the 
parties to agree on a compromise.  
 
Discussions involving all stakeholders are held as broad debates within and outside 
Parliament. The Conference of the Cantonal Governments plays a decisive role, as it 
is there that a compromise is sought and found among the cantons. However, the 
Conference of the Cantonal Governments has no competence to decide on the 
compromise to be reached. This is the responsibility of Parliament.  
According to the latest monitoring report by the Swiss foundation for federal 
collaboration, there are numerous obstacles impeding the effective protection of 
constitutional rights of the cantons and of federalism because, acts of the Federal 
Assembly and of the Federal Council cannot be challenged by the Federal Supreme 
Court.28 The Federal Supreme Court ensures that federal law is uniformly applied and 
that the boundaries set by federal law are not transgressed in the course of the 
enactment, application and interpretation of law and the administration of justice. As a 
result of its rulings, the Federal Supreme Court contributes to the development of law 
and its adaptation to changing circumstances.29  
  
                                                          
27 Knoepfel, Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, pp.136.  
28 Ch Stiftung für eidgenössische Zusammenarbeit, Monitoringbericht Föderalismus 2014 –2016, p.51.  
29 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, The Third Power within the Federal State, Lausanne 2016, p.6.  
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3.5.  PENALTIES   
The practice of political compromise also has an impact on the question of financial 
consequences for those involved in the NFE. The federation as well as the cantons 
prefer cooperative to conflictual strategies.   
 
Nevertheless, for joint responsibilities the federal legislation has a mechanism that 
allows the federation to retain funds if cantons have not met their responsibilities 
according to agreed requirements. This mechanism however has hardly been used. 
The federation tries much more to guide the cantons in their policy by incentivise certain 
achievements rather than to fiscally punish. 30   
     
                                                          
30 Interview with Paul Winiker, Minister of Justice and Security, Canton of Lucerne, 23.08.2018  
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 Funding of Common Frameworks  
  
4.1. FUNDING PRINCIPLES IN THE NFE  
The goals of fiscal equalisation are reached by means of a complex system of 
equalisation payments (see Figure 5). 31 The total volume of equalisation payments is 
almost CHF 5.1 billion for 2018, and consists of the following three mechanisms:  
 
FIGURE 3: THE THREE EQUALISATION MECHANISMS:  
  Amount  
(2018, 
CHF 
million)  
Description  
Cohesion  
Fund  
297  Reduces the financial losses of financially weak cantons 
when switching from the old system to the new fiscal 
equalization. The Confederation finances two thirds of this, 
with the rest coming from the cantons based on the number 
of inhabitants. It is allocated exclusively to the financially 
weak cantons and has been declining by 5% p.a. since 2016.  
Resource  
Equalization  
4,074  Based on the resource potential of the cantons. It is made up 
of the taxable income and assets of natural persons and the 
taxable profits of companies. The potential levels are used to 
divide the cantons into financially strong and financially weak 
cantons (see Figure 2 below).   
Financially weak cantons receive freely disposable financial 
resources from   
• financially strong cantons (horizontal 
resource equalization) and  
• the Confederation (vertical resource 
equalization).   
Tax competition is maintained in the process.  
Federal 
Cost 
Compensa- 
tion  
718  Refers to excessive costs associated with 
geographical/topographic and socio-demographic factors, 
which, for structural reasons, result in higher costs for the 
provision of public goods and services. The Alpine cantons 
have higher costs for infrastructure, winter road maintenance 
and schools (e.g., school buses), for instance. The centrally 
situated cantons frequently have an above-average 
proportion of elderly, poor and foreign people.  
Total 
Volume of 
Equalization 
Payments  
5,089    
  
                                                          
31 Federal Department of Finance, Fiscal equalization payment 2018 in CHF mn,  
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home/themen/finanzpolitik/national-fiscal-equalization/fb-nationaler-
finanzausgleich/grafik-nfa.html  
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As shown in Table 4 below, the term “fiscal equalisation” (Finanzausgleich) is used 
differently in Switzerland than it is in Germany or Austria. In both neighbouring 
countries, the income of the federal states and communes is largely determined by 
foreign sources, i.e., by the central government or the federal state.32  
  
  
FIGURE 4: THE TERM „FISCAL EQUALISATION”:  
  
The meaning of the term “Fiscal Equalisation” in:  
Switzerland  Germany  Austria  
Equalisation of differences in 
resources and burdens among 
cantons or communes. This is 
subsequent redistribution of 
revenue gained.  
Broad definition, which generally includes the 
distribution of expenditure and revenue between 
state levels. This is referred to as "secondary active 
financial equalisation," the aim of which is "to level 
out as many differences as possible in terms of 
resources and burdens."  
  
The money is redistributed vertically from the Confederation to the cantons and 
horizontally among the cantons. Cost compensation is borne entirely by the 
Confederation. The financially strongest cantons are (in alphabetical order) Basel City 
(BS), Geneva (GE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), Schwyz (SZ), Zug (ZG) and 
Zurich (ZH).   
 
FIGURE 5: OVERVIEW OF SWISS NATIONAL FISCAL EQUALISATION   
  
                                                          
32  Lukas Rühli, Irrgarten Finanzausgleich: Wege zu mehr Effizienz bei der interkommunalen 
Solidarität, Avenir Suisse, 2013: According to Avenir Suisse, the Swiss think tank, where the local 
authorities hardly bear any responsibility for their expenditures and revenues, the resulting disparities 
might largely be compensated by the higher state level. Member states and communes, however, 
are becoming decentralised executive bodies of the central state. This has little to do with autonomy, 
let alone Swiss sovereignty.  
18    Keller/Ebnöther/Ursprung  
  
4.2. FUNDING OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES  
The implementation of the NFE did not only aim at disentangling the allocation of tasks 
between the federation and the cantons, it was also expected, that the remaining joint 
responsibilities could be organised more efficiently. According to the second NFE 
effectivity report, such efficiency gains have only been achieved in the area of national 
roads and highways. Despite the reforms with the NFE, the funding of joint 
responsibilities is still a controversial issue, particularly in the areas of social security 
and public health. Given the mixing system where tasks and responsibilities are (still) 
not clearly disentangled, there is a risk of disincentives and wrong decisions since costs 
can partially be passed on to another level. For this reason, discussions on a reform of 
the NFE, asking for a NFE 2 have already started in the last few years.   
  
4.3. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES  
4.3.1. International treaties and cantonal authority  
The NFE directly affects the allocation of tasks between the federation and the cantons. 
While most policy areas are within the national sovereignty of Switzerland, international 
negotiations do not affect them directly, but certainly indirectly. Two cases must be 
distinguished here: There are situations where only the competences of the federation 
are affected by international negotiations. Negotiations and the assessment of 
consequences for federal responsibilities are the responsibility of the federal 
government. However, there are also situations where international negotiations by the 
federation affect the much more extensive competences of the cantons. For example, 
in 1999, the Swiss government signed the Bologna Process. This had a considerable 
effect on the academic structure of Swiss universities, which are the competence of the 
cantons. Because foreign policy, and thus negotiating treaties, is the responsibility of 
the federal government, it results in a serious challenge for the Swiss cantons.  
 
The federal Constitution allows the cantons to participate in the decision-making 
process of the federation: Art. 45 of the federal Constitution regulates general 
participation, in particular legislation, while Art. 55 specifically enshrines the 
participation of the cantons in foreign policy. The federation is, therefore, obliged to 
attach particular attention to claims by cantons that their competences are affected. In 
the preparation of international negotiations, early involvement by the cantons is 
particularly important. Only in this way can the cantons participate effectively in foreign 
policy projects that affect their responsibilities or key interests.  
 
4.3.2. Reform in 2013  
In actual fact, however according to the cantons, this has hardly ever happened before 
2013, which is why the cantons asked the federation to strengthen their participation 
rights in matters of foreign policy. Their demands include state-internal reforms by the 
Federal Council to enable the cantons to maintain their autonomy against the 
background of progressing European integration and globalisation. In particular, the 
cantons wanted the Confederation to adapt the existing legal framework to enable 
cantonal interests to be taken into account more easily.  
 
The main aim was to ensure that the federal level (Federal Council, Parliament and 
administration) has a comprehensive duty to provide information. Secondly, a standard 
deadline of three months should be set for the submission of cantonal comments on 
government proposals. This period is only to be shortened in cases of urgency justified 
in writing. Thirdly, cantonal statements on European policy projects concerning 
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cantonal competences should be given more weight. At the same time, however, the 
government's ability to act in matters of European policy should not be 
disproportionately restricted.  
 
Initially, the Federal Council was reluctant to respond to the demands of the cantons. 
A certain improvement has been noted by the latter in recent years, although it is slow 
and only concerns certain areas. Noteworthy is a partial improvement of the 
Consultation Procedure Act and individual valuable policy areas, such as European 
policy. In addition, the cantons are involved more actively than before in the negotiation 
processes of the federation. They now have to right to participate in the negotiations 
rounds directly. The right to participation and information still has to be actively enforced 
by the cantons, however. Their greatest challenge is their goal to achieve more 
involvement in the whole process of foreign policy negotiations (including exploration 
and non-formal stages of negotiation).   
 
This concern is important to the cantons because they fear that a lack of understanding 
about federalism in the EU will lead to a strengthening of the trend towards 
centralisation in Switzerland in the medium to long term. The cantons feel that the 
constitutional allocation of tasks between the federation and the cantons is alien to most 
European states and the EU, giving rise to the assumption that the federation is 
responsible for all areas and is thus their exclusive negotiating partner. This entails the 
risk that the federation will actually acquire all powers, including those of the cantons.  
   
4.3.3. The Role of the CCG  
The Conference of the Cantonal Governments plays an important role in this context. 
It is the central provider of information to the cantons, particularly with regard to the 
direction of Switzerland's foreign and European policy. For this purpose, an agreement 
was reached with the federal government that CCG employees will be integrated into 
the federal administration. For example, one CCG representative works in the 
Directorate for European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Justice and 
Police Department and in the Swiss Mission in Brussels.33 They have full access to the 
data of the national administration. Their task is to evaluate information according to its 
relevance for the cantonal governments and to advise them concerning the CCG.34   
The CCG Services working group continues to pursue the intensified efforts of the 
federal government with a view to concluding free trade agreements as well as updating 
and further developing existing free trade agreements with third countries outside the 
EU - either bilaterally or within the framework of EFTA. Cantonal representatives also 
participated as observers in the meetings of the EFTA Regional Forum.36   
   
                                                          
33 Mr. Roland Krimm, who represents the cantons in Brussels has held this position for 15 years and is 
considered to be one of the most senior experts on Swiss-EU relations in Switzerland.  
34 Interview with Roland Mayer, Head Foreign Policy, Conference of the Cantonal 
Governments of Switzerland (CCG) 36 CCG annual report of 2017, p. 22.  
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 Policy Making Arising from Common 
Frameworks  
  
5.1.  FLEXIBILITY OF SUB-STATE JURISDICTIONS WITHIN COMMON 
FRAMEWORKS  
As mentioned at the beginning, the cantons are the very foundation of Switzerland's 
political system. Significantly, there is no list of cantonal competences, unlike in the 
case of the federation, whose powers must always be based on a federal law. The 
cantons are therefore responsible for all policy areas that have not been explicitly 
allocated to the federation. This mechanism is similar to the division of competences 
between Member States and central institutions within the EU. This leaves them a 
comparatively high degree of flexibility within their policy areas.   
 
As discussed above also within joint responsibilities the federal government leaves the 
cantons a degree of flexibility to adapt to local conditions. This is often done through 
program agreements and financing.   
 
However the new distribution or reallocation of joint responsibilities is relatively 
inflexible process, firstly, because a large number of stakeholders (the federation and 
its 26 cantons) is involved and, secondly, because the change processes take a long 
time. Changing a joint responsibility requires extensive dialogue and a joint decision. It 
is more common for adjustments to take place at the funding side. 
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National Fiscal Equalization (NFE):  
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home/themen/finanzpolitik/national-fiscal-equalization.html  
  
Fiscal equalization payment 2018:    
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/en/home/themen/finanzpolitik/national-fiscal-equalization/fb-nationaler-
finanzausgleich/grafik-nfa.html   
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https://www.efv.admin.ch/efv/de/home/themen/finanzausgleich/wirksamkeitsberichte.html   
  
Conference of the Cantonal Governments:  https://kdk.ch/   
  
  
  
LIST OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES ANALYSED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT  
1 Homeland security and preservation of historical monuments  
2 Musical education  
3 Individual health insurance premium reduction  
4 Financing nursing care  
5 Hospital financing  
6 Health, people and animals  
7 Supplementary benefits AHV and IV  
8 Family allowances  
9 Family allowances agriculture  
10 Contributions to private organisations for old-age and disability assistance  
11 Start-up financing for childcare to supplement family care  
12 Financing public pension funds  
13 Execution of sentences  
14 Restructuring of the asylum sector  
15 Integration of foreigners in the area of specific integration promotion  
16 Implementation of the Civil Protection and Civil Protection Strategy 2015+  
17 Official Surveying and PRLR Cadastre  
18 Sports promotion (compulsory sports at school)  
19 Regional policy  
20 Unemployment insurance: job placement and labour market measures  
 
21 Labour Market Controls Posting of Workers Act  
22 Labour Market Controls Illegal Employment Act  
23 Training contributions (scholarships and training loans)  
24 Vocational training  
25 Regional passenger transport  
26 Financing and expansion of railway infrastructure (FABI)  
27 Financing road infrastructure  
28 agglomeration programmes  
29 Building programme (partial earmarking of the CO2 tax)  
30 Programme SchweizerEnergie  
31 Energy supply  
32 Nature and landscape protection, (forest) biodiversity and wildlife  
33 Hazard prevention including protection forest  
34 Higher education   
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